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When asked to reflect upon the problem of unenumerated rights,
most constitutional theorists are likely to understand the invitation as
raising questions about the legitimacy of a court exercising its osten-
sibly "countermajoritarian" judicial review powers while invoking a
right not specifically named in the text of the Constitution.1 In this
article, I will take the invitation somewhat differently, instead as rais-
ing questions about both the necessity and propriety of rights enu-
merations. This point of entry does not preclude an acknowledge-
ment of the question of legitimacy in the exercise of the power of
judicial review pursuant to an unenumerated right, but it takes that
question as part of a more capacious and comprehensive whole.
Looking at the whole will allow us, first, to take into account prob-
lems of enumeration-that is, of lists-that arise in the practice of
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"popular constitutionalism" taking place outside the courts, in both
institutional and non-institutional settings. Second, it will allow us to
relate problems of enumeration, whether they arise as problems fac-
ing institutionally authoritative interpreters of texts (like judges) or
2textual drafters, to broader political regimes or orders. In this way,
the problem of unenumerated rights can be considered less as a
problem of the appropriate assertion of judicial power than as a part
of the broad tapestry of American constitutional culture and constitu-
tional politics, both inside the courts and out. I have no intention of
availing myself here of the traditional freedom law journals provide
to attempt to publish what amounts to a book on this topic. Rather
than delving too much into details, I pass relatively quickly over a few
historical markers. My modest goal is to suggest new, and potentially
stimulating, ways to think about a familiar area of longstanding juris-
prudential debate.
If we consider unenumerated rights not purely judicially, but
more universally as appeals made both inside and outside of the
courtroom on behalf of rights not specifically listed in the Constitu-
tion, and in some cases appeals made to textually-listed rights as mere
illustrations of rights having their origins in broader non-textual
sources, it becomes clear that appeals to unenumerated rights have
been a constant in the American political tradition since the nation's
very inception. There is no reason to believe that this will change any
time soon. That said, though, if we track the path of constitutional
development long-term, there are clearly periods in American politi-
cal and constitutional history when the polity, key sectors of the pol-
ity, or politically significant institutions such as courts, or constitu-
tional drafting conventions, focus more intently on the question of
enumeration as a pressing political and theoretical problem. If we
study these episodes of heightened consciousness of enumeration as
problems across time, we will find that they reveal the way in which
rights enumerations, objections to them, and arguments about their
purposes and comprehensiveness, serve distinctive purposes within
the developmental lives and histories of political and legal institu-
tions, and the life-cycles of governing political regimes.
2 For recent efforts in this regard, see Howard Gillman, Party Politics and Constitutional
Change: The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 138, explaining changes in judicial understandings of
the Constitution with reference to policy agendas of national governing coalitions; Ken I.
Kersch, The New Deal Triumph as the End of History? The Judicial Negotiation of Labor Rights and
Civil Rights, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at
169 (discussing changes in judicial understanding of the constitutionality of labor law in light of
New Deal legislation); Tushnet, supra note 1 (describing how judicial review contributes to the
construction of political order).
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I. PRELIMINARIES: UNENUMERATED RIGHTS AND WHAT THEY MEAN
Now
As a theoretical matter, and at the most general level-that is, con-
sidered separately from questions of institutional placement concern-
ing enforcement, within distinctive institutional and political con-
texts-it is not clear, first, what we mean by an "unenumerated right"
and, second, why a right's prior non-enumeration is of political or in-
tellectual significance. This is not to say, in the contemporary con-
text, that a significant number of people do not seem to be thinking
of the same thing when they think about unenumerated rights and
reflect upon their existence as a problem. In that context, the para-
digmatic unenumerated rights case arises when a court uses the
phrase "right to x" (e.g., "the right to privacy," "the right to treat-
ment," "the right to die with dignity," "the right of a parent to direct
the upbringing of his child," etc.) as its chief justification for voiding
a law or action as unconstitutional. The implication (and often, the
charge) is that, in doing so, the court has "created" or "invented" a
new right with no basis in the constitutional text. When a court acts
in this way, it is argued that it is, in effect, writing a constitution,
rather than interpreting one. This raises serious questions of the le-
gitimacy of the Court's exercise of its judicial review powers, since
those powers are premised on its presumably passive role in applying
the fundamental law of the constitutional text to the ordinary law
under consideration.3
It is notable, however, that in the most paradigmatic of these
"right to x" cases, such as Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court (as other
contributors to this symposium have noted) almost never completely
leaves the constitutional text behind. In Griswold, Justice Douglas fa-
mously referred to the "penumbras, formed by emanations from" the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, which, he ar-
3 For the classic defenses ofjudicial review on these grounds, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803) and THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961). See also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936) (stating that the duty of
the judge in assessing the constitutionality of a statute is "to lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares
with the former."). On this point, I fully agree with Frank Michelman's contribution to this
symposium, which argues that the unenumerated rights issue (today, for law professors) is
largely a question ofjudicial review and, moreover, that the criticism lodged against unenumer-
ated rights today is essentially that the court which invoked such a right in voiding a law strayed
"too far" from a reasonable interpretation of the text in finding such a right and, in doing so,
departed from an interpretive technique grounded in what Michelman calls "standard legal
method." Frank I. Michelman, Unenumerated Rights Under Popular Constitutionalism, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. (forthcoming Oct. 2006). See also Mark Tushnet, Can You Watch Unenumerated Rights
Drift?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming Oct. 2006) (subscribing to a similar view that the
Court strayed too far from a reasonable interpretation when creating unenumerated rights).
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gued, implied the existence of a "right to privacy. 4 Justice Gold-
berg's concurrence in Griswold recurred to the Ninth Amendment's
provision that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people. 5 For this reason, it is wrong to say that the interpreter
charged with having "invented" a new unenumerated right ignored
the text. What the interpreter actually did is read the text in an ex-
pansive way, to the point of teasing out a new category that can then
be applied by judges independently of its initial textual wellsprings.6
It is not at all clear that this newly generated category-the an-
nouncement of a fundamental, unenumerated "right to privacy"-
was a sine qua non of reaching the result in either the first case in an
identifiable line, or any of the subsequent decisions in that same
jurisprudential line. Justices Douglas and Goldberg, for example,
might have reached the same result in Griswold by the alternative
means of finding the right to purchase and use contraceptives pro-
tected as a form of the "freedom of speech." After all, the Court has
repeatedly held that the First Amendment's free speech protections
apply to expressive conduct.7 The Court has also indicated that sex-
ual conduct falls within the category of expressive conduct protected
under that Amendment, and under the Fourteenth Amendment as
well.8 Moreover, it is far from clear thatJustice Douglas needed to ex-
trapolate the existence of a "right to privacy" from the various
amendments he cited in his Griswold opinion (that he chose to do so
may have been characteristic of his particular, and peculiar, tem-
perament). As it is not clear that there needs to be one, and only
one, justification, it is similarly not clear that a married couple's right
4 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
5 Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also id. at 500 (going beyond the Ninth Amend-
ment argument, which depends on adhering to the incorporation thesis, to hold that Four-
teenth Amendment due process and liberty "stands... on its own bottom") (Harlan,J., concur-
ring).
6 On this point about interpreting to generate new categories, see Michelman, supra note 3,
and Tushnet, supra note 3.
7 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding that flag desecration is pro-
tected by the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag dese-
cration is expressive conduct and protected by the First Amendment); Clark v. Cmty. for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 486 U.S. 288 (1984) (stating that sleeping overnight in a public park could
be expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that wearing black armbands as a form of protest in a public school is
protected by the First Amendment); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(concluding that refusing to pledge allegiance to the flag in a public school is protected by the
First Amendment); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (concluding that displaying a
flag is expressive conduct protected by the Constitution).
8 See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (O'Connor, J., writing on her own
behalf in Part III) (stating that nude dancing is expressive conduct); Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing on his own behalf) (stating that nude danc-
ing is expressive conduct).
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to use birth control must, of necessity, derive from a single provision
of the Bill of Rights. The Court might have cited all the amendments
as essentially on par as applied to the facts of the case. Or it might
have cited the First Amendment as prima inter pares, and the other
amendments as secondary, but supportive. Arguably, none of these
alternatives to the announcement of a "new" constitutional right to
privacy would have been any less venturesome than the declaration of
a new, unenumerated right itself.9
Considered in the context of the problem the Court's liberal jus-
tices understood themselves to be facing at the time, the Griswold
opinion is, relatively speaking, quite grounded textually. After all,
the decision by Justices Douglas and Goldberg to ground the ruling
in a constellation of specific Bill of Rights provisions followed a series
of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century appeals to the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments alone as
independent sources of constitutional rights.'0 These appeals had
long since been anathematized by modern progressive liberals as a
form of illegitimate judicial legislation. Both Justices Douglas and
Goldberg were quintessential liberals deeply steeped in that heritage.
In the earlier line of "substantive due process" cases, there was a tex-
tual touchstone too: the word "liberty." But the conclusion by these
earlier "conservative" courts that there exists a judicially-enforceable
substantive constitutional right to "liberty" was taken by liberals as
presumptuous enough to subsume the entire constitutional (and po-
litical) system into a single word, and then turn the guardianship over
that word, and the principle it entailed, entirely over to judges upon
whom no discernable limits seemed to have been placed in interpret-
ing it. For understandable reasons, this was taken to be a serious
problem. But it is not at all clear that the problem was the absence of
a textual touchstone for the ruling. Rather, it was that the touch-
stone used ("liberty") seemed infinitely malleable.
The feint that Justices Douglas and Goldberg used was to anchor
their ruling not in the due process clauses, but rather in the Bill of
Rights. This move, however, does not remedy the problem. After all,
what if one is perfectly willing to interpret these ostensibly more con-
crete textual provisions-such as the free speech or Establishment
9 See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893, 1917 n.84 (2004) (stating that Griswolds treatment of fundamen-
tal rights signaled the start of the Court's expanded use of the term "liberty").
10 See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) (providing the right to contract
as part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom."); id. at 502 (White,J., concurring) (stat-
ing that the right to liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the right to
marry and raise children).
Sept. 2006]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
clauses of the First Amendment, or the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth-in ways that also appear to many to be almost infi-
nitely malleable? If this is the case, as indeed it has by now long since
been, it is not at all clear that the announcement of a new category of
rights is, in any independent sense, a significant problem rather than
a marker for a certain type of judicial temperament, or, in the idiom
of Professors Tushnet and Michelman in their papers for this sympo-
sium, respectively, a willingness to go "too far" in their interpreta-
tions, or to depart too radically in their interpretations from the ap-
plication of the widely-accepted "standard legal method." What
seems to have happened in Griswold is that the Justices sought to le-
gitimize the result in the case in a way that comported with their best
reading of the ideological environment extant at the time of their
ruling, which favored expansive readings of the Bill of Rights over
expansive readings of the Due Process Clause.
In the 1960s and 1970s, a "right to privacy" seems to have been the
Court's preferred grounds for rulings expanding the scope of indi-
vidual sexual and reproductive autonomy. But we can already see at
the turn of the twenty-first century, in the aftermath of a generation
of critiques of the "right to privacy" as not distinguishable in any use-
ful way from a Lochner-like substantive due process liberty ruling, how
simple it can be for the Court to drop the right to privacy language,
switch over to appeals to "liberty" and, in effect, continue to develop
the line of precedent along precisely the same substantive lines." In-
deed, the switch to a language of liberty rather than privacy seems to
have provided a new common ground for a new coalition of Democ-
ratic and (more libertarian) Republican appointees. The enforce-
ment of an unenumerated right continues. But it is no longer clear
whether that right has any consistent name.
1I. WHO'S AFRAID OF UNENUMERATED RIGHTS?
If we consider the question of rights enumerations not simply ju-
ridically, but universally, it is clear that neither the public generally,
nor political conservatives, are hostile to the idea of unenumerated
rights. It is thus not at all clear that unenumerated rights, as such,
1 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-67 (2003) (concluding that liberty protected by
the Constitution forbids the proscription of same-sex sodomy); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (reaffirming that the right
to an abortion is a liberty protected under the Constitution); see also RANDY BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004) (emphasizing the liberty, rather than privacy, as-
pects of these rulings); Seth Kreimer, Rejecting "Uncontrolled Authority Over the Body": The Decencies
of Civilized Conduct, the Past and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcom-
ing Nov. 2006) (focusing on the rights at issue in these cases as rights of bodily integrity or
autonomy).
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have any principled and consistent opponents-a fact that bodes well
for their future within American law and politics.
To be sure, in the post-Griswold era, many (though not all) con-
servatives have become vehement critics of unenumerated rights like
the right to privacy. At the same time, however, these same conserva-
tives are often simultaneously the most boisterous cheerleaders for
the proposition that there is a "higher law" or "natural law" back-
ground inherent in the American political and constitutional tradi-
tion. Allusions to the opening words of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence are standard, as are arguments tracing Jefferson's words
forward into Lincoln's thought, and onwards into the Constitution
itself. 2 In many respects, this reading of the American constitutional
and political tradition is incontrovertible and should hardly be con-
sidered the insight of a "conservative" reading of the nation's political
past. The assumption that Americans are possessed of God-given po-
litical and constitutional rights-some of which are enumerated, and
some not-pervades the thinking of the greats (Jefferson, Lincoln,
and Locke before them), the people themselves, and (much less fre-
quently, but nevertheless, longstandingly) the courts. 3 Indeed, much
of the conservative animus against recent reiterations of a right to
privacy by the Supreme Court is rooted in natural rights arguments
alleging that, in announcing this "new" right to the use of birth con-
trol, abortion, and same-sex intimacy, the Court has arrayed itself
against the reason inherent in the God-given natural order. 4 For
these conservatives, the problem is less that the Court has shown itself
to be a non-positivist believer in natural law and that it confers rights
on the basis of that law, but rather, that its understanding of natural
law (or right) is wrong, and, indeed, corrupt. Although some natural
law proponents remain textualists and positivists when it comes to
12 GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA (1992); see
also HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUES IN THE
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 308-29 (1959) (discussing Lincoln's views about the equality of
men under the Declaration of Independence). See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER
LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955) (portraying American constitu-
tional law as a product of earlier legal regimes).
13 For useful evidence of this, with an emphasis on the courts, see James W. Ely, Jr., "To pur-
sue any lawful trade or avocation": The Evolution of Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth
Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L., 917 (2006) and R.H. Helmholz, The Law of Nature and the Early
History of Unenumerated Rights in the United States, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L. (forthcoming Oct. 2006).
14 See generally HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS ANDJUSTICE (1986) (contemplating the interaction of man-made law with moral law);
HADLEY ARKES, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE (2002) (discussing how the con-
troversial issues of privacy, abortion, and birth control implicate important questions of natural
law).
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questions of the judicial power to interpret legal texts, 5 many, one
suspects, would be perfectly content if the Court's interpretations of
ostensible natural rights coincided more completely with their own
reading of the natural order. If the Court were to do this, after all, in
their eyes, it would simply be affirming, and not inventing.
In short, if (as Justice Black famously insisted in Griswold),l un-
enumerated rights are simply appeals to natural law in a different
form, then there is absolutely nothing new about unenumerated
rights, and conservatives are, by and large, no more critical of them as
a matter of principle than are liberals. They would derive those
rights in different ways, and apply them in very different cases.
III. UNENUMERATED RIGHTS AS A PROBLEM
While appeals to unenumerated rights in American culture, poli-
tics, and law are perpetual, enumeration problems are cyclical,
though not necessarily in any regularized sense. They move to the
fore and disappear as the polity moves through time, as they relate to
broader questions of regime politics.'
7
As noted above, in the form we know it today, the enumeration
problem is, first and foremost, a problem of judicial power. This was
not always the case. If we approach the subject from a perspective
that places cycles in the salience of the enumeration problem within
a broader framework taking into account debates about rights lists
both in the courts and outside them, we can identify at least four pe-
riods in American constitutional development when such lists ap-
peared as serious intellectual and political "problems": first, in the
debate between the Federalists and the Anti-federalists over the addi-
tion of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution; second, in the first stage
of the debate, inaugurated by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his late-
nineteenth-century Supreme Court dissents, over whether the Four-
teenth Amendment "incorporated" the Bill of Rights as protections
against the conduct of the states; third, in the mid-twentieth-century
Black-Frankfurter debates over incorporation; and, fourth, in the
15 See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY
1 (1993) ("[T]here is nothing in principle unjust about the legal enforcement of morals or the
punishment of those who commit morals offenses.").
16 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (BlackJ., dissenting).
17 Some academics have focused on American political development as a distinctive vantage
point for understanding political and legal change. See KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK,
THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 26 (2004) ("The questions taken up by
(American Political Development] research are seldom disembodied from the life of the polity
itself; more often than not, they are keyed to its changing circumstances and integral to its lived
experience."); PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS
(2004) (discussing a process oriented view of political development); THE SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
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contemporary attack launched by textualists and originalists against
unenumerated rights (particularly against the "right to privacy" an-
nounced by the Court in Griswold).
These four episodes in the history of the enumeration problem
relate to regime politics in different ways, and present distinctive po-
litical and legal problems. They also vary along a number of dimen-
sions, which include: 1) the felt imperative of compiling and publicly
announcing a list of protected rights; 2) the presumption that the
rights on the list are judicially enforceable; and, 3) the presumption
that only the rights on the list are judicially enforceable (that is, the
insistence that the list is comprehensive and complete).
As Mark Graber has outlined in his contribution to this sympo-
sium, these episodes, in many respects, can be understood as debates
(whether between antagonistic parties, or within a governing coali-
tion, or in the process of drafting a constitution, or modifying one)
over the best strategy for protecting constitutional rights. One strat-
egy (and a strategy especially familiar to us today in an age of power-
ful courts) is to specify the rights and interests to be protected in the
language of a constitutional text. A second is to specify, through an
enumeration, the powers that government officials may exercise
(with the implicit assumption that any acts that extend beyond those
powers are unauthorized, and hence, a presumed invasion of rights).
The third is to structure government institutions in such a way that,
in its normal operations-through the abrasion and collision of
power against power-the system would work to preserve rights.
Needless to say, over the course of American history each of these has
played a part in rights-protection efforts under our Constitution. Dif-
ferent strategies have predominated in different eras. And within
those eras, each had distinctive sets of advocates and detractors.
Graber's approach is one useful way to consider the place of dis-
tinctive rights-protecting strategies within the trajectory of American
political and constitutional development. My approach, which is not
inconsistent with his, focuses in particular on salient episodes of de-
bate about the propriety of enumeration, given the background as-
sumption (which Graber explores, but I simply note) that a particular
set of institutions is likely to be the polity's chief instrument of rights
protection.
IV. A HISTORICAL TAXONOMY OF THE ENUMERATION PROBLEM
Earlier enumeration problems were presented in three distinct
episodes: first, the Founding; second, the late nineteenth century
debate about the scope of judicial power to enforce individual liber-
ties pursuant to the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment; and,
third, the mid-twentieth century Black-Frankfurter debate over the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states. While all shared
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a preoccupation with the necessity and propriety of drawing up pub-
licly promulgated lists of protected rights, which entailed a debate
about what rights should be added to the list, and what was properly
left off, as well as about whether the list was intended to be compre-
hensive, each of these episodes raised very different legal, political,
and institutional problems. Only by undertaking a comparative as-
sessment of these diverse confrontations with the enumeration prob-
lem can we properly situate our own enumeration problem. This is a
prerequisite to assessing the prospects for unenumerated rights in
the American political future.
At the time of the Founding, the problem of enumeration was a
problem of the sort characteristic of any constitutional founding:
what to put in and what to leave out, or, put otherwise, what to list
and what not to list. A founding problem is a regime problem in its
most elemental sense. While there is much dispute, imprecision, and
inconsistency in discussions ofjust how we identify political and legal
regimes, few would disagree that a polity's decision to create an en-
tirely new slate of governing institutions-institutions that then, in
turn, subsist and develop through time-represents the inauguration
of a new political and constitutional regime.
Of the several enumeration episodes I explore here, the Founding
episode tracks to the greatest extent the sorts of questions Graber
raises. Here, the debate really is, at its core, about the best strategies
of protecting rights. How important are (enumerated) "bills of
rights" for rights protection? How important, relatively speaking, are
questions concerning the enumeration, not of rights, but instead of
governmental powers? 8 How important are structural features of the
constitutional architecture, such as the "double security" of the sepa-
ration of powers (where ambition counteracts ambition) and federal-
ism's "compound republic," relative to rights enumerations?' 9 Within
this debate, of course, there were those such as the Anti-federalists
who identified rights enumerations as crucial, and others who ac-
corded them (at least at the national level) considerably less signifi-
20cance.
18 See THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 177 ("[T]he laws of
the Confederacy as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction will become the
SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and
judicial in each State will be bound by the sanctity of an oath.") (emphasis in original); THE
FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 515 ("[T]he Constitution is it-
self... and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.") (emphasis in original).
19 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 320 (arguing that "the interior
structure of the government [must be designed so] that its several constituent parts may, by
their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places").
20 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 510-20 (argu-
ing that the Bill of Rights is unnecessary due to the broad power vested in the people).
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When it came to central enumeration problems of this era as I
conceive them-whether the U.S. Constitution should include a list
of textually enumerated rights-the problem during this episode
sounded chiefly in federalism. It entailed a controversy and debate
about the best way to protect the people and their states (with which
they more deeply identified at the time, both culturally and politi-
cally) from the potential predations of a distant central government
radically more powerful than the one known during the predecessor
Articles of Confederation. In that way and others, the debate and
controversy was quite distinct from the contemporary enumeration
problem, which is preoccupied with uncabined judicial power. To
the minor extent that the Founding Era enumeration problem was
understood as a judicial power problem, it was seen as a problem of
the power of federal judges as instruments of central state policy2
and not necessarily as potential usurpers of the power of a democ-
ratically elected Congress (of which the Anti-federalists were equally,
perhaps even more, suspicious).22 Many, and perhaps most, took the
enumeration problem at this time as raising questions likely to be re-
solved not by courts, but through public debate, within and outside
the elected institutions of government. At that time, and unlike to-
day, few understood the proposed enumeration to be either exhaus-
tive or exclusive. At the time of this initial enumeration, there were
considerable doubts in some quarters about the propriety and neces-
sity of a national-level enumeration that arose, not out of any doubt
about the substantive content of the rights to be enumerated, but be-
cause some feared that any enumeration made would naturally be
presumed to be exhaustive and, hence, actually a helpmeet to the ag-
grandizement of national power. Ultimately, to allay any fears of the
former presumption, the Ninth Amendment3 was added to the Bill of
Rights.
2
21 See generally KEN 1. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2004) [hereinafter KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING
CIVIL LIBERTIES] (suggesting an alignment of interests between the central state and landmark
judicial decisions); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981)
(describing a similar judiciary-legislature relationship in England, Imperial China, and the
courts of Islam).
See, e.g., Essays of "Brutus" to the Citizens of the State of New York, reprinted in THE
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 306 (Michael Kammen
ed., 1986) (insisting that the federal judiciary will act consistently to advance the claims of the
national government, restricting the prerogatives of the states).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
24 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 513-14 (arguing for
the proposition that the enumeration of rights in the Constitution might lead some to conclude
that unenumerated rights were excluded from constitutional protection); see also Suzanna
Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1987) ("[T~he found-
ing generation did not intend their new Constitution to be the sole source of paramount or
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Once it was decided that a Bill of Rights would be added to the
Constitution by the First Congress, there was, of necessity, some dis-
cussion and debate about what particular rights to include in the list
and which ones to leave off, and about the particular verbal formula-
tion with which to express those rights. But, unlike today, when law
professors actively compete with each other to formulate endlessly
creative proposals for "new" fundamental rights, at that time the
rights to be included were drawn for the most part from a template
slate of rights enumerated in the English Bill of Rights, and, in some
cases, the pre-existing state constitutions. They occasioned relatively
little controversy. This was because at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted, the degree to which the textually enumerated rights were to
be judicially enforceable was unclear, both as a theoretical and prac-
tical matter. In the Founding Era, the judicial review powers of the
federal courts, while conceivable, had yet to be definitively claimed.
The status of the Bill of Rights as legal commands-as opposed to po-
litical touchstones-was unsettled.2 The institutional architecture of
the federal judiciary was unbuilt. And the institutional prestige of the
federal courts was weak and politically suspect. At the time, who
knew what the implications, as a judicial matter, of a nationally-
enumerated Bill of Rights would be?
When it next appeared, the enumeration problem assumed a very
different guise. In the Founding Era, the necessity of having a na-
tional rights enumeration was championed as part of a broader Anti-
federalist, and, subsequently, Jeffersonian rights-protection strategy
that also championed a strict construction of the enumerated limits
of the federal powers, a suspicion of federal judges and federal
courts, and an aggressive defense of robust understandings of the
structural protections provided by constitutional federalism and the
separation of powers. In the next episode in which enumeration as-
sumed the status of a problem, the questions of national enforcement
power-of institutional capacity of national institutions-were highly
prominent. Some of the rights at issue in this subsequent episode
higher law, but instead envisioned multiple sources of fundamental law."). I would note that
these fears actually belatedly came to pass under the twentieth-century regime of general pow-
ers and preferred freedoms, with the former envisaging islands of powers in a sea of rights, and
the latter the opposite. See Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedons: The Progressive Expansion of State
Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q. 623, 624 (1994)
("U]udges in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were interested in constructing gen-
eral protections for liberty broadly defined ... rather than special protections for a handful of
particularly important liberties.").
25 See generallyJACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1996) (discussing the view amongst some in the Founding generation that
a Bill of Rights would be monitory rather than [legally] mandatory).
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were new.26 But some-and I will focus on these here-were the very
same Bill of Rights provisions that had been enumerated in the first
enumeration episode. The question this time was whether the Civil
War and the amendments to the Constitution that were adopted in its
wake had altered the terms of the original political settlement con-
cerning the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states2 7  This
time, in a radically altered policy environment, the Bill of Rights
enumeration was offered not as a protection of the independence
and power of the states and a restriction on the powers of the na-
tional government, but rather as a means for the national govern-
ment to control the behavior of the states as they sought to act upon
the persons residing or moving within them. In this second enu-
meration episode, questions ofjurisdiction of the supervisory and en-
forcement powers of national political institutions-both of Congress
and the federal courts-were crucial.
The central figure in this next encounter-which involved a de-
bate over whether the Fourteenth Amendment required the Bill of
Rights to be "absorbed" or "incorporated" as protections against the
states-was (the first) Justice John Marshall Harlan. While, as Felix
Frankfurter noted, Harlan's views on this were considered an "eccen-
tric exception" at the time, they helped inform mainstream under-
standings of the applicability of the Bill of Rights in the mid-twentieth
century.:s The Founding Era enumeration debate was fought primar-
ily in the realm of constitutional ratification and electoral politics.
The second was taken up in the realm of jurisprudence; that is, as an
interpretive question coming before federal judges. Although Justice
Harlan is taken to be a progenitor of the next enumeration contro-
versy-the Black-Frankfurter debate of the 1940s-Justice Harlan's
assumptions and concerns were in many respects quite different from
the later debates they adumbrated. Justice Harlan was not particu-
26 Amongst those that were new were the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guar-
antee, the Fifteenth Amendment's protection of voting rights, and the statutory rights set out in
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
27 See, e.g., Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845) (holding that the Constitu-
tion of Louisiana could not be reviewed by federal courts for non-compliance with the First
Amendment's religion clauses); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause inapplicable to actions taken by the states).
28 As I will note below, Harlan's views were not the same as the views later adopted (in part
through appeals to his authority) in the mid-twentieth century. See KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING
CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 21, at 86-87 (describing the legacy of Harlan's lone dissents in a
series of criminal cases as "early, principled commitments to a rights-protective theory of incor-
poration"). By focusing on this episode as an interpretive problem for the courts, I do not
mean to ignore the fact that the question was first discussed in Congress at the time of the draft-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. As it turns out, however, those debates became significant
chiefly as aides to judges charged with discerning the "true" meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as it was invoked to decide concrete legal cases.
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larly troubled (or at least concerned in any sustained way) with what
later generations took to be the "profound" problem of untethered
judicial power. Justice Harlan understood the enumeration of rights
in the Bill of Rights to be but one source of judicially enforceable
federal rights. In his opinions (often dissents) regarding the applica-
bility of those rights to the states, he did not especially trouble him-
self over settling on a single grounding for the rights. For Justice
Harlan, history, tradition, natural law, or textual enumeration would
do, and each would do just as well as the other. He commonly cited
many of these touchstones simultaneously. 9 Although Frankfurter
would later charge Justice Hugo Black with following in Harlan's
footsteps in setting out his theory of "total incorporation," Harlan's
rather open-ended approach, in its original form, would hardly have
answered the concerns about rampant judicial discretion that Black's
theory of total incorporation was designed to address. It was fash-
ioned not to keep judges from drawing from ostensibly inappropriate
non-textual sources of law, but to arrive at the answer to the question
"which rights are so fundamental as to be appropriately considered
national?" This was a different concern, and a different constitu-
tional problem.0
The Harlan Era Court bequeathed to its twentieth-century succes-
sors a world in which the Supreme Court came to understand itself,
and was understood by others, as a crucial defender of the protection
of rights and liberties at the national level-a distinctively modern
model of rights protection that is only one of many imaginable mod-
els concerning the best way of advancing the same ends.3 In this way,
the ostensibly conservative Harlan Court, despite its rejection of the
theory that the Bill of Rights was enforceable against the conduct of
the states, 2 begat our modern Supreme Court, and set the stage for a
policy environment in which concerns about "judicial activism," "ju-
dicial restraint," and 'judicial supremacy" moved to the front and
The decision to do so seems to be quite common in the American political and legal tra-
dition, perhaps even more the rule than the exception. At about the same time, in his fight
against the labor injunction, American Federation of Labor leader, Samuel Gompers-at the
time an aggressive critic of judicial power-referred simultaneously to the First Amendment,
the Magna Carta, God's law, and universal human rights in making his "constitutional" appeals,
Ken I. Kersch, The Gompers v. Buck's Stove Saga: A Constitutional Case Study in Dialogue, Resis-
tance, and the Freedom of Speech, 31 J. Sup. CT. HIST. 28 (2006).
0 1 do not mean to deny that this was also a question in the Black-Frankfurter debate. But,
in that later episode, it was considered alongside the highly-charged concern with run-away ju-
dicial power. I canvass Justice Harlan's approach to incorporation at some length in my book.
See KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 21, at 86-87.
3 See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights, 9 U.
PA.J. CONST. L. (forthcoming Nov. 2006).
.2 But see Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (con-
cluding that the Takings Clause is applicable to the states).
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center. The liberal justices of the modern Court were staunch critics
of the earlier Court. But, nevertheless, they ultimately welcomed the
responsibilities it had created and assumed. In the third enumera-
tion episode, both Black and Frankfurter took the problem of un-
cabined, anti-majoritarian, judicial power as their overriding concern.
The central question in the famous debate between Hugo Black and
Felix Frankfurter was whether a commitment by judges to hold the
textually enumerated provisions of the Bill of Rights to be applicable
to the states-all of the provisions, and only those provisions-imposes
the sort of discipline on the exercise of judicial discretion that would
confine judges to a constitutionally appropriate role, thus preserving
the prerogatives of a representative, democratic government. Justice
Black's faith was that it would. Justice Frankfurter contended that
any such faith would be misplaced, and that Black's focus on the en-
forcement of enumerated rights, and enumerated rights only, was
likely to prove a false hope. Character and a self-restraining tem-
perament-and not text-Frankfurter believed, was the only real
hope.
Subsequent developments--developments which have set the
stage for the enumeration problem we face today-proved Black and
Frankfurter both to be correct in their fears, and overly sanguine in
their remedies. Black had insisted that judicial power could be ap-
propriately constrained only by judges committed to grounding all of
their rulings in explicit provisions of the constitutional text. But dur-
ing the Court's Warren (1953-1969) and Burger (1969-1986) years,
there was no particular correlation between the Court's decision to
cite a particular textual provision and the modesty of the Court's am-
bitions. 4 Those Courts certainly proved venturesome in their appli-
cation of the unenumerated right to privacy. But they were equally
venturesome in their interpretations of the Equal Protection and Es-
tablishment Clauses, and the Constitution's other plainly enumerated
provisions. While the former forays, of course, spurred one set of
criticisms (that the Court was not interpreting the text), and the sec-
33 See MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER, HUGO BLACK, AND
THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 131 (1984) (comparing Frankfurter's and Black's
views onjudicial decision making,judicial restraint, and the applicability of the Bill of Rights to
the states).
." See MORTONJ. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL
ISSUE (1998) (examining the impact of the Warren Court's expansion of civil rights and liber-
ties); RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 1953-1993 (1994)
(analyzing the similarities and differences in constitutional jurisprudence between the Warren
Court and the Burger Court); EARL M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER,
1969-1986 (2000) (examining the extent to which judicial restraint and a commitment to the
constitutional text drove decision making of the Burger Court); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000) (discussing and analyzing the major decisions
of the Warren Court in terms of their immediate effect on society).
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ond a slightly different set (that the Court was interpreting the texts
willfully and, in some cases, whimsically), both were criticisms of the
5
core problem: willfuljudging and unrestrained judicial power.
Justice Frankfurter had been convinced from the outset that this
would be the case and that efforts to constrain judicial power through
what he took to be a naive faith in textualism were doomed to failure.
On this he was proved correct. He argued in turn that the only way
judicial power could be confined to its appropriate scope was if
judges were steeped in an understanding of the nature of their role
within the larger political system-through a thoroughgoing process
of professionalization in which they learned to appreciate that they
were judges, and not legislators. WhatJustice Frankfurter did not an-
ticipate, but did witness, was the almost complete collapse of this tra-
dition within the political coalition of which he was a part (post-New
Deal Democratic Party liberalism), and the substitution of a new
transformational model of the appropriate role for a judge that had
been forged in the crucible of the civil rights movement, and subse-
quent "liberal" social movements (on the behalf of women, the poor,
the mentally ill, gays and lesbians, and others). This model saw the
judge as an active reformer and a moral leader. By watching the
Warren Court and, subsequently, by sitting at the feet of professors
who worshipped it, a new generation of lawyers and judges learned
that a significant part of the Supreme Court's role was to exercise a
leadership role in transforming the nation into a more just society.
In this context, the intellectual support structure for the sort of
craftsmanlike professionalism of limited ambitions had all but col-
lapsed. The liberal Justice Frankfurter, who stuck to his guns in in-
sisting on judicial restraint, when both textual and non-textual rights
were concerned, became, in this new context, widely identified as a
conservative.
V. THE PRESENT ENUMERATION PROBLEM
The enumeration problem we confront today is both a function of
today's distinctive policy environment and a sequential developmen-
tal product of this history of earlier enumeration problems. The past
remains present in today's enumeration problem for a number of
In the effort to correct these failings, the next step, which supplements the criticism of
unenumerated rights, was to insist that a textual provision be interpreted in light of its original
meaning. Justice Black, with his attentiveness to questions of history and original meaning, was
a major influence on this step. SeeJOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 68-73 (2005) (discussing Black's views on the relevance
of original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment to judicial interpretation). Discovering
whether an originalist posture was itself ultimately constraining, either as a practical matter or
in theory, was the next step in this debate.
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reasons. One is that, given the nature of the American constitutional
tradition, the normative debate concerning the best means of pro-
tecting rights has never been settled. Another is that the provisional
settlements in those ongoing normative debates have institutional
embodiments (such as a powerful, right-enforcing Supreme Court)
that, while never final, are difficult to dislodge by those inclined to
oppose them. That said, though, contexts and policy environments
do change. But those changes are undertaken, inevitably, as part of
an ongoing dialogue with the past.
As contemporaries who have witnessed the post-history of the
Black-Frankfurter debate over the importance (or false hope) of tex-
tual enumeration, we now know that both of those Justices' proposed
remedies for the ostensible problem of runaway judicial power failed,
less as a matter of logic than as a matter of institutional sociology.
Their diagnosis proposed remedies that presupposed that lawyers
and judges would be molded through a certain sort of professional
socialization, and imbued with a certain set of attitudes toward legal
texts and the judicial role, all of which came under sustained assault
in the mid-twentieth century. Changed understandings of the most
appropriate role of judges, lawyers, and legal texts inspired the devel-
opment of new interpretive theories better tailored to the new politi-
cal context. At the extreme, but not the fringe, were "noninterpretiv-
ist" theories, which held that the constitutional text itself was largely
irrelevant to judges ruling in constitutional cases. More moderate
versions of the new approach held not that the text was irrelevant,
but rather that to interpret a constitutional text was ultimately (and,
indeed, inevitably) to engage in a creative exercise of moral philoso-
phy, and that, as such, the lion's share of the effort in constitutional
studies should be directed towards the study of philosophy and ap-
plied ethics, rather than traditional questions of interpretation and
common-law-style reasoning. By the lights of this new family of inter-
pretive theories, to insist on textualism was to be naive about the con-
straining capacities of language.
Many made the mistake of assuming that because the chain of in-
quiry undertaken by scholars had been traced to its conclusion, his-
tory had reached its end, and henceforth only rubes would believe
that judges were constrained by texts. But, of course, history did not
stop here. These interpretive theories were deployed in defense of
actual rulings and policies. Their fate was thus tied inevitably not
only to their abstract logical or philosophical plausibility, but to the
perceived successes and failures of the policies with which they were
associated. These interpretive theories were at their high-water mark
at a time when public confidence in liberal policy programs was at its
peak. Their credence began to fall as those policy programs, and the
constitutional and statutory decisions that served to support them, ei-
ther failed or came under sustained political attack. Since the Su-
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preme Court had been a key player in the rise of Great Society liber-
alism, it was a key target for Great Society liberalism's opponents.
Conservatives undertook a sustained attack both on a liberal activist
Court, and the interpretive theories that enabled it. Along the way,
these interpretive theories lost much of their political support outside
of the increasingly closed academic circles in which they were dis-
cussed. Many came to see arguments that, in a stampede toward
"fairness" and "social justice" (rightly understood), passed impatiently
over the provisions of the Constitution itself as the willful assertions
of an increasingly arrogant and condescending liberal law school
elite. They increasingly dismissed non-interpretivism, along with pro-
nouncements from the legal academy concerning questions of consti-
tutionality, out of hand. A theoretical correction was long overdue.
Arguments focusing on the constitutional text, and some form of
original meaning, assumed a new prominence.
Today we are witnessing a textualist renaissance in American con-
stitutional thought. This, of course, is evident in conservative
thought, where the influence of Justice Scalia's textualism has been
profound.3 7 But it is also evident amongst liberals, where newly tex-
tualist approaches have risen to prominence because they are mani-
festly better attuned to a conservative political context. After the
death of non-interpretivism and the more freewheeling, untethered
versions of living constitutionalism, there seem to be three alternative
versions of legal liberalism currently vying for preeminence: 1) mul-
tiple origins originalism; 2) welfare constitutionalism; and 3) transna-
tional rights enumeration. If liberals continue to exert a significant
influence on the development of American constitutional law, one
(or some combination) of these theories may very well provide the
context for the future of (liberal) versions of unenumerated constitu-
tional rights.
There have been several contenders for preeminence amongst lib-
eral constitutional theories seeking to preserve and extend the liberal
36 See POWE, supra note 34 (discussing the relationship between political forces and decisions
by the Warren Court); Howard Gillman, Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political Ori-
gins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 1, at 138 (analyzing the role of political agendas in explaining judicial interpreta-
tions of the Constitution).
37 See RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA'SJURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION 29 (2006)
(analyzing Scalia's textualism and the impact of this view); cf ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (1997) (presenting Scalia's hallmark version
of textualism and academic commentaries on this view).
I will put to the side the question of conservative unenumerated rights. There is no rea-
son to conclude that conservatives won't advance their own versions of unenumerated rights.
My discussion of these versions of liberalism is drawn significantly from Ken I. Kersch, Justice
Breyer's Mandarin Liberty, 73 U. C-II. L. REv. 759 (2006) (exploring the different versions of lib-
eralism as they relate to justice Breyer's thought and jurisprudence).
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constitutional regime generated during the Warren and Burger years
that gave the country both Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade.35
The first, "multiple origins originalism,00 joins conservative original-
ism by venerating the Founders. It then goes on, however, as many
conservative originalists do not, to take up the whole of American his-
tory sequentially, multiplying the number of "foundings" in the
American constitutional tradition. Multiple origins originalists argue
that the contemporary Supreme Court must interpret the Constitu-
tion in light of a synthesis of these multiple foundings, which, as de-
mocratic expressions of popular sovereignty, are every bit as constitu-
tionally authoritative as the eighteenth-century Founding itself. Akhil
Amar's version of this approach forges a second line of commonality
with conservatives by supplementing its originalism with a consistent
textualism. In his first book-length iteration, Amar emphasized what
were essentially two foundings: one in 1789 and one brought about
by the Civil War Amendments.4' As he has recently developed this,
while still placing the lion's share of the emphasis on these two
foundings, he reinforced a theme of an ever-more-democratizing
constitutional text by a focus on the subsequent addition of the Pro-
gressive Era and Kennedy-Johnson Era amendments. 42 Bruce Acker-
man's version of this approach emphasizes the same first two found-
ings as Amar, but adds a non-textual third Founding to the mix-
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.43
A second major category of arguments on behalf of sustaining
(and, perhaps, expanding) New Deal and Warren Court liberalism in
a conservative political and constitutional age are those grounded in
so-called "welfare" or "positive rights" constitutionalism. Welfare con-
stitutionalists, who are also (in their way) originalists, have argued on
behalf of sweeping governmental powers (and, indeed, governmental
duties and responsibilities) and against more "formalistic" arguments
about textually stipulated powers and their limitations in the interest
of advancing and enforcing the collective social good in the face of
countervailing interests. Welfare constitutionalists typically empha-
size the Constitution's character as a charter of not only "negative"
but also of "positive" rights, or affirmative constitutional duties. As
39 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40 Kersch, supra note 38, at 810-11.
41 See AKIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, at xv (1998)
(explaining how the Fourteenth Amendment transformed the original Bill of Rights).
42 See AKHIIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 403-47 (2005) (discussing
the historical development of the Constitution and how the different amendments have af-
fected its interpretation).
43 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, I WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 48-50 (1991) (arguing that the
New Deal altered constitutional decision making); BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (same).
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was the case with multiple origins originalism, welfare or positive
rights constitutionalism comes in more- and less-textualist versions.
The more-textualist welfare constitutionalists, like Sotirios Barber,
derive their understandings from readings of the Constitution's
broadly worded provisions, like the Preamble, and its assertion that
the text was designed to "promote the general welfare" (along with
similar statements from an array of Founders and subsequent touch-
stone figures acceptable to conservatives, such as Abraham Lincoln-
but not Franklin Roosevelt). Barber argues that the particular provi-
sions of the Constitution must be interpreted in light of the docu-
ment's overarching objective, which is to promote "the general Wel-
fare" or to advance the collective public good."
Other welfare constitutionalists, like Cass Sunstein, appear less
fully textualist in placing emphasis on the (non-textual) New Deal
transformation. But to characterize this as a form of non-textualism
may be misleading, for Sunstein's trick is to appeal to a whole new set
of texts as potential grounds for the Court's protection of new rights.
Just as many conservatives have argued that the Declaration of Inde-
pendence is, for all intents and purposes, part of the Constitution's
text, Sunstein appeals to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "Four Free-
doms" speech as, essentially (like the Declaration), a constitutional
document.45  But Sunstein's welfare constitutionalism is conjoined
with the third version of legal liberalism concerning rights currently
jockeying for preeminence: transnational rights enumeration. In his
recent work on constitutional interpretation, Sunstein has made vig-
orous appeals to the post-World War II rights enumerations in inter-
national (and European) declarations, conventions, and treaties as
relevant touchstones for domestic American constitutional under-
44 See SOTIRIos A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (2003) (arguing that "fidelity
to the American Constitution entails a concern for... 'the solid happiness of the people'"); see
also CASS SUNSTEIN & STEPHEN HOLMES, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES
15 (1999) ("Personal liberty, as Americans value and experience it, presupposes social coopera-
tion managed by government officials.").
45 See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND
WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 5 (2004) (viewing FDR's Four Freedoms and Second Bill of
Rights as reflected in the Court's late-twentieth-century jurisprudence). The bite noire of "posi-
tive rights" (or constitutional "duties") constitutionalists is less Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
64 (1905)-which invalidated state regulations limiting the hours bakers could work in the state
of New York-than the Rehnquist Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social
Services, 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989) -which held that a county was not liable to a boy repeatedly
beaten by his father when county social service providers knew of the beatings but failed to re-
spond, which is anathematized in this literature. See, e.g., Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming Oct. 2006); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Mer-
ritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 256-57
(1999) (arguing that the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights require that
minimum levels of education, employment, and subsistence be offered to all people in the
world).
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standings. Sunstein's call for a new attentiveness to such touchstones
resonates with a swelling body of work which understands that post-
War international order as a new and distinctive political regime, a
"constitutional" order in its own right.46
This international regime or "constitutional" order (sometimes
referred to as the "new international law") had its genesis in human-
ity's own global enumeration problem or episode. At the end of the
Second World War, efforts to prosecute Nazis (and others) for the
violation of a set of basic international (or universal) human rights
proved unexpectedly problematic, because the rights being appealed
to had not been specifically enumerated in advance of the acts
deemed to have violated them. This raised serious rule-of-law prob-
lems involving questions of notice and retroactive punishment. What
followed was a cascade of rights enumerations-often drawn up by
philosophers and groups of transnational activists acting either above
or outside of the constraints (and responsibilities) of domestic poli-
tics-of varied (and, in most cases, ambiguous, though "evolving")
legal status. Indeed, much of the post-War human rights order has
47
appeared to have been driven by a passion for rights enumerations.
In this order, it might be said-with little exaggeration-that the goal
is that every potential right be enumerated somewhere. Considered
together, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Cove-
nant on Social and Economic Rights, the Genocide Convention, the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Inter-
national Convention on the Rights of Women, not to mention the
various European and regional declarations, set out extensive rights
enumerations.
The legal status of these rights and the obligation of diverse insti-
tutions (like domestic courts) to either enforce them or accord them
weight has, to date, been ambiguous. Nevertheless, much of the
scholarship that characterizes the post-War world generally as having
launched a new "constitutional" international order calls upon offi-
cials within domestic governments around the world to integrate
themselves more fully into transnational "global governance" net-
works, where they will work across borders with fellow professionals in
other countries and in international organizations to proffer solu-
46 E.g., G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE
REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS (2001).
4 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 77 (2001) (stating that one international group
"concluded that it was possible to achieve agreement across cultures concerning certain rights
that 'may be seen as implicit in man's nature as an individual and as a member of society and to
follow from the fundamental right to live"').
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tions to common sets of problems.48 Many of these global governance
networks take up highly technical questions of science and environ-
mental policy, communications regulation, or antitrust, to name just
a few areas, and envisage increasing interaction between career pro-
fessionals with special technical expertise in administrative agencies.
But many proponents of global governance understand rights ques-
tions in very much the same terms. They see judges and courts as es-
sentially the equivalent of the expert administrators in the particular
"policy" area concerning rights. In this vision, which is fast becoming
a touchstone of liberal constitutional thought, judges around the
world engage in an increasingly routine "court-to-court" dialogue to
arrive at more sensible "expert" judgments about the instrumentalist,
functionalist or purposive meaning of rights. 9 In many cases, domes-
tic judges integrated into these networks will consult with each other
transnationally to arrive at "improved" interpretations of the rights
that are already enumerated in their domestic constitutions. In oth-
ers, judges will appeal to new enumerations, as set out in interna-
tional (and foreign) declarations, covenants, and treaties, as relevant
sources for rulings on domestic constitutional questions.
The degree to which these new, post-War enumerations are con-
sidered legally binding varies by country and by the particular enu-
meration in question. Many, however, understand that patchwork
status quo as temporary and as a prelude to an evolution of what will,
in time, become a global legal order; while certain of these rights
enumerations may not be legal at the moment, they are envisaged as
becoming legally binding in the future. Many liberal American law
professors are now working hard to work out the theoretical mecha-
nisms through which these international and foreign enumerations
might be currently considered binding, or, in time, made so. 0 Other
48 See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 195 (2004) ("[H]eads of state,
prime ministers, regulators, judges, legislators, pundits, and scholars everywhere [should] em-
brace[] the concept of government networks as prescription rather than description and [seek]
actively to create and use them as instruments of global governance."); see also Ken I. Kersch,
Constitutions and What they Mean Today: The Brewing Battle Between Charter and Network Constitu-
tionalism, LAW & Soc. INQUIRY (forthcoming).
49 See generally AHARAN BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (2005) (arguing for a pur-
posive interpretation of rights driven by an increasingly international context); STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005) (hinting at the
notion of an international,jurisprudential conversation).
See KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES supra note 21, at 341 ("In recent years, one of
the most striking turns in elite intellectual life in the United States, particularly within political
science and constitutional law, has been a rapidly burgeoning interest in the concept of 'global'
or 'world' constitutionalism."); Ken I. Kersch, Multilateralism Comes to the Courts, PUB. INT., Win-
ter 2004, at 3, 4 ("The [Supreme] Court's multilateral turn, however, is no accident. Behind
these seemingly benign references to international agreements and foreign practice stands a
vast and ongoing intellectual project.... ."); Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism, the
GlobalizedJudiciary, and the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 346 (2005) [here-
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more strategically cautious liberal law professors have set themselves
to the task, not of advancing theories of how these enumerations
might be made legally binding on American courts, but rather on
how to convince American judges that they are under a professional
obligation to be aware of these foreign and transnational rights enu-
merations, to consider them, or to give them due weight in their rea-
soning about the content of domestic constitutional provisions.
If a new international legal order is at hand, which is understood
to be "constitutional," then this new set of foreign and international
enumerations (or some subset of them) may very well, in time, as-
sume the status of additions to the Bill of Rights. If this is the case, it
is not clear whether we would want to characterize this as an appeal
to unenumerated rights, or instead, as an extension of the list of
enumerations to which we hold ourselves legally bound. It is possible
that these external enumerations might come to stand in American
courts in the position that the Bill of Rights provisions named in Jus-
tice Douglas's Griswold opinion did to the "right to privacy" an-
nounced by the Court. They could, that is, be referenced either sin-
gly or in multiples as supportive of either a particular reading of a
textual constitutional right that comports with (for example) Euro-
pean practice, or alternatively, as providing support for a newly ar-
ticulated unenumerated right, such as "the right to die with dignity,"
"the right to treatment," etc. If this comes to pass, the new set of
post-War transnational enumerations would provide an entirely new
means of legitimizing decisions by American courts to declare new,
unenumerated rights.
So far as regimes are concerned, this can be looked at in two ways.
It might be considered part of a strategic effort to extend the (do-
mestic) liberal constitutional regime through moral exhortations in-
volving foreign and international sources of law. Alternatively, it
might be viewed as a broader, transnational effort to build what is es-
sentially a new legal and institutional order. Liberals will assign do-
mestic judges an important role in building and maintaining that or-
der. The appeal of this turn to liberal Democrats has only been
enhanced in recent years, as the party has argued on behalf of a re-
vived multilateralism in the face of the ostensibly disastrous "unilater-
alism" of the much-despised Bush Administration.5' This turn would
inafter Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism] (arguing that the decision of several Supreme
Court Justices to look to the constitutional law of other countries in the course of interpreting
American constitutional law "is part of an elite-driven, politically-motivated world-wide trend to
judicial governance . .. ").
5 See Ken 1. Kersch, Multilateralism Comes to the Courts, supra note 50 (arguing that the Court's
use of multilateralism represents "a vast and ongoing intellectual project" to internationalize
the Constitution).
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be the constitutional and judicial adjunct of Democratic Party foreign
policy multilateralism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although there is little doubt that the Supreme Court is (and has
been) moving in a conservative direction in recent years, it would be
foolish to write off a bright future for unenumerated rights. The tra-
dition of appealing to such rights, both in courts and outside of
them, is too deep. That tradition, moreover, has sustained itself no
matter which direction the politics of the moment have gone. Over
the long term, it tracks neither liberal nor conservative dimensions.
Anyone taking a historical or developmental approach to the subject,
and also an approach that is not exclusively juriscentric, will conclude
with confidence that unenumerated rights will remain a secure part
of the American political tradition.
Unenumerated rights as a problem, by contrast, has always been
an episodic affair. The history of rights enumeration episodes dem-
onstrates that they have very different characters. This makes it very
difficult to reach any general conclusions about them. But it does
suggest that unenumerated rights are not really a problem on their
own terms, or for any one reason, but only in light of other political
problems and challenges facing historically-bounded political institu-
tions and governing political regimes. Rights enumeration problems
do not always appear in the same guise. Some raise questions of judi-
cial power, whereas others do not; some are focused on the relation-
ship between the central government and the states, while others are
not; some contemplate enumerations as exhaustive lists, and some do
not; some are taken up in periods where texts tend to be (relatively)
strictly construed, and some do not (which thus raises the question of
how distinctive, in practical terms, is an unenumerated right, as op-
posed to an expansively construed enumerated right).
For many, the problem of unenumerated rights today is less a
question of those rights, per se, than of the future of the instantia-
tions of those rights most familiar to us since the Warren Era-the fu-
ture, that is, of judicially-protected rights to individual bodily auton-
omy that many people have come to understand as synonymous with
"the right to privacy." Anyone contemplating the future of these in-
stitutions would need to spend less time reflecting on considerations
of legitimate judicial power and the constraints of constitutional texts
than on cultural questions concerning religion, technology, and
medicine-and their relation to normative judgments concerning the
respective claims of an individual to bodily autonomy versus the
counterclaims of the state on behalf of public health, safety, and mor-
als. Obviously, this is a completely different question than the one I
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have taken up here, and one about which I have no special exper-
tise.
Given the developmental history or rights enumeration episodes
in the American constitutional tradition, what can we say about the
likely future of unenumerated rights? I have argued as prognostica-
tion above that three features of the current context and policy envi-
ronment may prove especially relevant. The first is the trend toward
conservatism, on the Court and in American politics more generally.
The second is a reaction against noninterpretivist methods in favor of
a new textualism. The third is the belief by many in an emergent sys-
tem of "global governance" or a new international "constitutional"
order. Most liberals are hopeful (and, indeed, sometimes millennial)
about the last. They have taken stock of the current context and as-
similated the second. And they are miserable about the first. This
suggests that now is the perfect time for them to be combing the
world for a broader set of texts, which they hope American judges will
either rely upon, or be influenced by, in interpreting the American
Constitution in ways more conducive to their political objectives. To
be sure, there are other routes to the same end (like multiple origins
originalism and welfare, or positive rights, constitutionalism). But for
many liberals, the appeal to foreign and international rights enu-
merations is likely to prove the most exciting or innovative in the
53coming years.
At the time of the Black-Frankfurter debate, it was possible to be-
lieve that the position one took on enumerated versus unenumerated
rights would provide a solution to the problem of uncabined judicial
power. No one believes this any more. The problem is not amenable
to logical solution. What counts, instead, is the judge's attitude con-
cerning his role. Many liberals increasingly believe that, in reflecting
on rights, it is the duty of American judges to take into account the
nature of the broader international order. They also believe that it is
a matter of professional good practice for a judge to socialize and
52 See Kreimer, supra note 11, for discussion of some of these issues.
53 It is not really as original or innovative as they suppose. There was a similar burst of en-
thusiasm in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. It would be well worth study-
ing the parallels between that historical moment and our own, and of the theories of "world
government" then and "global governance" now being crafted in the crucibles of those mo-
ments. I have suggested a parallel between these moments in several places, but only in pre-
liminary form. See, e.g., KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 21, at 103-12 (illus-
trating the parallelism of those two moments); Kersch, Tie New Legal Transnationalism, supra
note 50, at 347-50 (arguing that "legal scholarship has swelled with discussions concerning the
relationship between domestic legal decisions, foreign practices, and international law"). See
generally MI. WARREN WAGAR, BUILDING THE CITY OF MAN: OUTLINES OF A WORLD CIVILIZATION
(1971) (providing a detailed study of the earlier moment in the Second World War); W.
WARREN WAGAR, THE CITY OF MAN: PROPHESIES OF A WORLD CIVILIZATION IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURYTHOUGHT (1963) (same).
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consult with judges of other countries who are called upon to serve
similar domestic duties. 4 If judges internalize this attitude, we will
find them in coming years increasingly willing to cite enumerations
wherever they may find them. Whether they then use these to an-
nounce new rights or to interpret domestic rights in a particular way
is neither here nor there. This phenomenon, if it comes to pass, may
very well constitute our next enumeration problem. If it does, we will
increasingly ask questions such as what within the emerging "global"
regime is to be part of the new list? To what degree are domestic
judges charged with enforcing that list (or considering it seriously)?
How should a domestic judge position and understand himself as an
actor committed to governance and/or government?
This episode has just begun to reveal itself. But there is a very
good chance that it will structure the central enumeration problem
of the future.
See Ken I. Kersch, The Supreme Court and International Relations Theory, 69 ALB. L. REV.
(manuscript at 20, on file with author) (forthcoming 2006) (illustrating the Supreme Court's
new attention to the role of judges in constructing a peaceful, prosperous, and just interna-
tional order).
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